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I. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION ENSURES THAT THE PEOPLE MAY 
BRINO A REFERENDUM AGAINST A NEW TAX SCHEME ENACTED 
BY A MUNICIPALITY. 
Article VI of the Utah Constitution guarantees the 
people the right to initiate or refer »anv legislation,"1 
To facilitate the orderly use of this right, the legislature 
is authorized to prescribe the ministerial tasks required to 
get the issue to the ballot, i.e. the forms to use, number of 
signatures and time deadlines. The legislature does not have 
the power, claimed by the Appellees (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Payson"), to preempt one type of legislation, 
be it a new tax scheme or new zoning ordinance, from the 
people's right of referral without amending the Constitution. 
Article VI, S 1 of the Utah Constitution states that the 
people may exercise the initiative and referral right "under 
such conditions and in such manner and within such time as may 
be provided by law." Mistakenly, Payson and Amicus Curiae 
(Salt Lake City Corporation) interpret this "condition 
precedent" to be an "exemption" that authorizes the 
legislature to exclude certain types of legislation from the 
people's referral and initiative rights. Such a reading of 
article VI strains the rules of grammatical construction, has 
no basis in law and is contrary to every Utah Supreme Court 
decision interpreting the referral and initiative right as 
1 Any "statutes that limit [this] power of the people to initiate 
legislation are to be closely scrutinized and narrowly construed" so 
as to preserve the people's right to petition the government. Meyer 
v. Grant. 486 U.S. 414, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1892-1983 (1988). 
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being available to challenge "any legislation." See, e.g., 
Shriver v. Bench, 6 Utah 2d 329, 313 P.2d 475 (1957); Wilson 
v. Manning. 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982). 
Simply stated, the issue presented in this case is 
whether or not the enactment of a new tax scheme is a 
legislative act. If it is a legislative act, it may be 
referred to the people. The test for determining whether an 
act is legislative or merely administrative is set forth in 
Appellants' Brief at 17-22. Being able to say whether "we do 
or do not want a new utility tax" is a legislative policy 
decision under that test. Moreover, the answer to that 
question is a broad, general directive statement that does not 
require any "specialized training." See Shriver v. Bench, 6 
Utah 2d 329, 313 P.2d 475 (1957). Contrary to Payson's 
contentions (Appellees' Brief at 32-35), Mr. Bigler and the 
Utah Taxpayers Associations (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as "Taxpayers") are not asking to interfere with 
administrative decisions such as "how much the police officers 
should be paid" or "how much money is needed to pay for snow 
removal this year."2 
Payson's argument that the referral right has been 
taken from the people because only the "corporate authorities" 
2 Payson's allegation (Appellees' Brief at 22-25) that any ordinance 
dealing with revenue raising or expenditures is exempt from the 
referenda provision is not veil taken. If this were true, almost 
every law would be excluded, because virtually every law entails 
raising revenues or spending tax dollars. 
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are empowered to levy taxes misreads the constitution and the 
cases of State v. Standford. 24 Utah 148, 66 P. 1061, 1063 
(1901) and The Best Foods, Inc. v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 
285 P. 1001, 1003 (1930). The constitution and these cases 
declare that the "legislature" cannot enact taxes for the 
municipality; i.e., "no other person or body other than the 
county" can enact local taxes. Payson's attempt to read "the 
county" as only meaning the county commissioners is wrong. 
The people can decide directly, rather than through elected 
representatives. If Payson's interpretation were correct, no 
initiative or referenda of any local matter would ever be 
allowed because only the county commissioners and city 
councilmen could act — not the people. Payson's argument 
does not give effect to all of the provisions of the 
constitution and contradicts article VI, S 1 which vests the 
right to refer legislation in the people. 
Moreover, Payson's claim (Appellees' Brief at 40-41) 
that Utah Code Ann. S 11-26-1 (1981)3 has already enacted a 
utility tax for the municipalities, and that the 
municipalities' only remaining duty is to set the rate and 
collect the tax, is contrary to their position that only the 
"city" can enact municipal taxes (Appellees' Brief at 32-35), 
and results from Payson's misreading of S 11-26-1. That 
section does not enact a tax, it merely authorizes the 
3 All subsequent citations to the Utah Code are to the most recent 
codification as amended. 
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municipality to enact a u t i l i t y tax by i t s own l e g i s l a t i v e 
ordinance i f i t so desires . Not a l l municipalities have 
chosen to enact a u t i l i t y tax under th i s provision and Payson 
did not choose to enact a u t i l i t y tax unt i l March 7, 1990, 
some nine years after i t was authorized to do so. When Payson 
decided to enact th i s new tax, the people then had the right 
to refer the decision to the general e lectorate . 
Payson's posit ion (Appellees1 Brief at 30-32) that 
other l imitat ions, besides the administrat ive- legis lat ive 
1imitation, may be placed on the right of referenda i s not 
correct. In dicta, th i s Court indicated that other cr i ter ia 
such as the e f f i c i ent management of municipal af fa irs should 
also be considered in determining what provisions are subject 
to direct l eg i s la t ion . 5 Dewev v. Doxey-Layton Reality Co., 
3 Utah 2d 1, 277 P.2d 805 (1954). In i n i t i a t i v e cases decided 
subsequent to Dewey, th i s Court incorporated the Dewey dicta 
as part of the "practicality tes t" in determining whether a 
4 If the s t a tu t e were given Payson's interpretation, only the 
l eg i s l a t i ve and constitutional acts authorizing municipal conduct 
would be subject to referenda as leg is lat ive a c t s . Accordingly, a l l 
municipal conduct would be administrative because the municipality 
would merely be implementing actions i t had previously been 
authorized to do. Not only i s this interpretation absurd, but i t 
gives no effect to the constitutional provisions and statutes 
providing for the referenda of municipal leg is lat ion. 
5 Payson's c i tat ion of State ex re l . Keefe v. Cltv of St. Petersburg. 
145 So. 175 (1933) i s not applicable to the case at bar. St . 
Petersburg only addressed whether various "budget appropriation 
ordinances" authorizing the expenditure of funds for such things as 
police sa l a r i e s are leg is lat ive or administrative. This question i s 
completely distinguishable from whether "a law enacting new tax 
scheme" i s administrative or l eg i s la t ive . 
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matter is administrative or legislative, shriver v. Bench, 
6 Utah 2d 329, 313 P.2d 475 (Utah 1957). As discussed in 
detail on pages 17-22 of Appellants' Brief, the Payson City 
Utility Tax (the "Utility Tax") clearly satisfies the elements 
of the tests used by the Utah Supreme Court to determine that 
an act is legislative in nature. 
In addition, a review of past state initiatives 
confirms that laws relating to tax schemes are subject to 
initiatives and referenda. See the Library of the Utah 
Lieutenant Governor for copies of the following initiatives: 
1990-Removal of State and Local Sales Tax from Food, 1988-Tax 
Spending Limitations, 1988-Tax Reductions, and 1988-Income Tax 
Credit for Private Education. All of these initiatives were 
reviewed by the Attorney General's Office and found to qualify 
for circulation and submission to the people. Op. Utah Att'y 
Gen. (April 5, 1989) (1990 Initiative seeking Removal of State 
and Local Sales Tax from Food) and Op. Utah Att'y Gen. (April 
16, 1987) (1988 Initiative seeking Tax Spending Limitations, 
Tax Reductions and Income Tax Credit for Private Education). 
If these initiatives were not legislative acts, they could not 
have been placed on the ballot. Payson attempts to discredit 
the impact of these state initiatives, claiming articles VI, § 
1; XI, § 5(a) and XIII, S 5 alter the initiative rights for 
cities to the extent that cities are authorized to restrict 
the types of legislation that are subject to initiative while 
the state is not. These provisions do not support such a 
-5-
position for the following reasons: (1) the pertinent 
initiative and referral language of article VI, S 1 is 
identical for cities and the state, (2) article XI, § 5(a) 
does not give cities any unique referral right it merely 
allows cities to levy taxes — a power the state also has, and 
(3) article XIII, § 5 also does not give the cities a unique 
referral right but merely prohibits the legislature from 
imposing taxes on the city. None of these provisions 
authorize the city to preclude certain legislation from 
initiative or referral. To the extent Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-
21(2) attempts to preclude certain legislation from initiative 
and referral on the city level it violates article VI# S 1* 
II. TAXPAYERS HAVE A FEDERAL RIGHT TO REFER THE UTILITY 
TAX. 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled, and Payson 
concedes, that when a state constitution grants its people the 
right to initiate or refer legislative acts it creates a 
federal right to petition the government that is protected 
under the United States Constitution. (Appellees' Brief 
at 44.) As set forth in Appellants' Brief at 17-25, Utah has 
granted its people the right to initiate or refer the Utility 
Tax. Accordingly, Taxpayers have a federally protected right 
to petition government for the repeal of the Utility Tax by 
way of initiative or referendum, and any improper restriction 
of the use of this right is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1986). 
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Payson does not rebut Taxpayers' federal claim that 
its First Amendment Right to petition government for redress 
of grievances through the initiative and referendum process 
was abridged when Payson refused to issue certified petition 
copies. Payson only attempts to rebut Taxpayers' federal 
claims by claiming that Taxpayers' right to free speech has 
not been abridged because other avenues of free speech were 
still available. This position is not well taken and has been 
expressly overruled by the United States Supreme Court: 
That appellees remain free to employ other 
means to disseminate their ideas does not take 
their speech through petition circulars 
outside the bounds of First Amendment 
Protection. Colorado's prohibition of paid 
petition circulators restricts access to the 
most effective, fundamental, and perhaps 
economical avenue of political discourse, 
direct one-on-one communication. That it 
leaves open "more burdensome" avenues of 
communication does not relieve its burden on 
First Amendment expression. 
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (1988). 
By refusing to issue certified petition copies to the 
Taxpayers, Payson precluded Taxpayers from being able to 
engage in one of the most effective forms of political 
discourse on this issue — the circulation of certified 
petition copies. Even if Taxpayers could have made their own 
"home-made" petition copies, the effectiveness of their 
ability to engage in political discourse with such petitions 
would have been diminished by the lack of authenticity of the 
petitions and the declaration from Payson that it would not 
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r e c o g n i z e t h e r e f e r e n d u m b e c a u s e i t b e l i e v e d a r e f e r e n d u m 
d e a l i n g w i t h a " t a x l e v y " was i m p r o p e r . 6 
I I I . TAXPAYERS ARE ENTITLED TO A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT 
THEY MAY BRING A REFERENDUM OR REPEAL INITIATIVE 
AGAINST A NEW MUNICIPAL TAX SCHEME, SINCE THEIR 
ACTION IS NOT TIME BARRED. 
Signif icant ly # Payson premises i t s e n t i r e f i r s t 
argument, (Appellees' Brief a t 9-21), on the conjecture t h a t 
t h i s act ion i s ba r r e l by the 30 day l imi t a t ion period for 
f i l i n g referendum p e t i t i o n s . See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 20-11-24(1). This argument i s wrong and f a i l s to recognize 
t h a t the 30 day time l imi ta t ion for f i l i n g referendum 
p e t i t i o n s has nothing t o do with t h i s case . The gravamen of 
t h i s case i s Payson's refusal t o recognize the Taxpayers' 
appl ica t ion and issue c e r t i f i e d p e t i t i o n copies for 
c i r c u l a t i o n — not the f i l i n g of a completely signed p e t i t i o n . 
Payson claims that Meyer v . Grant i s not appl icable because i t deals 
with a prior r e s t r a i n t . Prior r e s t r a i n t i s not the contro l l ing 
i s sue in Meyer. the contro l l ing i s sue i s whether the conduct of the 
c i t y or s t a t e "impedes the sponsors' opportunity to disseminate 
t h e i r views" through the use of p e t i t i o n cop ies . In Meyer. the 
Supreme Court found that a law l imi t ing who could c i r c u l a t e p e t i t i o n 
copies impeded the dissemination of the sponsors' views and was thus 
uncons t i tu t iona l . 486 U.S. 414, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (1988) . This being 
the case , c l e a r l y a Utah law prohibi t ing the c i r c u l a t i o n of p e t i t i o n 
copies on a l e g i s l a t i v e matter i s uncons t i tu t iona l . 
- 8 -
A. Taxpayers' Declaratory Action Is Not Time Barred 
By Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-24(1). 
Although the Taxpayers timely and properly filed an 
application for referendum petitions pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 20-11-7, (R. at 1), Payson refused to provide the 
Taxpayers with certified petition copies as required by Utah 
Code Ann. SS 20-11-11; 20-11-21 and 20-11-23(2)(a). 
Importantly, Utah Code Ann. SS 20-11-11; 20-11-21 and 20-11-
23(2)(a) impose a ministerial duty upon city recorders to 
"furnish five copies . . . of petition[s] . . . to the 
sponsors of [an] initiative or referendum.» Id. S 20-11-11. 
More importantly, this Court has acknowledged that in 
furnishing the petition copies a city recorder, like the 
secretary of state, "'cannot pass upon the constitutionality 
of any proposed law." Coleman v. Bench, 96 Utah 143, 84 P.2d 
412, 413 (Utah 1938) (quoting White v. Welling, 89 Utah 335, 
57 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1936)); gge also. Op. Utah Att'y Gen. 
(Apr. 16, 1987) (1988 Initiatives seeking Tax spending 
Limitations, Tax Reductions and Income Tax Credit for Private 
Education). 
In Coleman v. Bench, the plaintiffs brought an action 
to compel the "City Recorder of Provo City, to solicit bids 
from printers for the printing of petition copies as required 
[by the Initiative and Referendum law at that time]." 84 P.2d 
at 413. The city recorder in that case had refused to solicit 
printing bids for the second of two proposed ordinances 
-9-
designed to repeal a bond ordinance. The recorder attempted 
to *justif[y] his refusal on the ground that [bond] ordinances 
[once] passed constitute a contract and cannot be repealed 
without impairing the obligation of contracts; consequently, 
any vote passing [plaintiffs'] ordinances would be 
unconstitutional and void." Jd. Ruling on that case, this 
Court held that *[a]n officer whose duty it is to act 
ministerially cannot be the judge of what may in the end be or 
be not constitutional . . . ." Id. 
Significantly, the factual situation of the present 
case is virtually identical to Coleman, unlike the cases cited 
by Payson. Payson's references to Allan v. Rasmussen, 101 
Utah 33, 117 P.2d 287 (1941); and Riverton Citizens for 
Constitutional Government v. Beckstead. 631 P.2d 885 (Utah 
1981), (Appellees' Brief at 10-11), are inapposite because 
those cases dealt with the filing of petitions and not with 
the filing of an application. Moreover, in those cases local 
government did not interfere with the plaintiffs' attempt to 
comply with the statute. The plaintiffs in those cases merely 
failed to comply with the statute because of their own 
conduct. Thus, those cases do not support Payson's contention 
that the present declaratory action is time barred by Utah 
Code Ann. S 20-11-24(1). 
It is unconscionable to believe city government can 
frustrate the Taxpayers attempt to comply with the filing 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-27 by not issuing 
-10-
pet i t ion copies and then assert noncompliance with the statute 
as a defense. The law i s well established that a municipality 
i s estopped from asserting a s t r i c t statutory compliance 
defense when i t was the cause of the noncompliance. 
Payson's reference to Palmer v. Broadbent, 123 Utah 
580, 260 P.2d 581 (1953), (Appellees' Brief at 11-13), which 
i s also distinguishable from the case at bar, supports 
Taxpayers' position that a municipality cannot interfere with 
a party's attempt to comply with the referendum statute and 
then assert that the party did not s t r i c t l y comply with the 
statute . In Palmer, the recorder accepted the p l a i n t i f f s ' 
application for pet i t ion copies, cert i f ied the original , but 
delayed in getting copies of the pet i t ion printed. Id. 
Fearing the delay would make i t impossible for p la in t i f f s to 
circulate the pet i t ion for signatures, the p la in t i f f s took the 
law into their own hands and made their own pet i t ion copies 
and cer t i f i ca tes which the recorder refused to sign, as 
required by law, even though she possessed an original 
cer t i f i ca te which she had made and signed for the p l a i n t i f f s . 
In that case, th i s Court ruled that the c i ty could not defeat 
the pet i t ion by al leging non-compliance with the statute 
7 See Fredrichsen v. City of Lakewood. 491 P.2d 805, 809 (Cal. 1971) 
("The c i t y cannot frus trate p l a i n t i f f ' s attempt to comply with a 
s ta tu te enacted for i t s benef i t and then asser t noncompliance as a 
defense .") ; F i l i p o v . Chang. 618 P.2d 295, 300 (Haw. 1980) 
(government's a s ser t ion of "non-compliance with [procedures ac t ] i s 
unconscionable when i t i s the government's misfeasance and 
nonfeasance which are responsible for the non-compliance"). 
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because the recorder had #fail[ed] to do her duty for the 
sponsors* and because the plaintiffs had done all they could 
to comply with the statute. Id. at 585. 
Critically, this Court did not say that the 
plaintiffs were required or even allowed to submit home-made 
petitions when the city prevented filing. Rather, it merely 
stated that it would accept the uncertified copies of the 
certified original under the circumstances. Payson's 
inference that Taxpayers' should have made their own petitions 
is not appropriate. Unlike the city in Palmer, Payson did not 
accept the Application For Petition Copies and did not sign an 
original certificate. This distinction effectively made it 
impossible for the Taxpayers to employ the same type of 
conduct as the Palmer plaintiffs. 
Because Payson's references are inapposite and 
Coleman v. Bench unequivocally supports the Taxpayers' 
position that Payson erred in not accepting the Taxpayers' 
Application For Referendum Petitions and in not issuing 
certified petitions, this Court should hold that Taxpayers' 
declaratory action is not time barred by Utah Code Ann. § 20-
11-24(1). 
B. Payson Refusal To Provide Taxpayers With 
Certified Referendum Petition Copies Created A 
Justiciable Controversy That Is The Proper 
Subject Of A Declaratory Action. 
The Utah Declaratory Judgment Act expressly provides 
that any person "whose rights, status or other legal relations 
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are affected by a statute . • . may have determined any 
question of construction or validity arising under the . . . 
statute and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other 
legal relations thereunder." Utah Code Ann. S 78-33-2. 
Payson's refusal to provide Taxpayers with certified petition 
copies as required by Utah Code Ann. SS 20-11-11 and 20-11-
23(2)(a), (Appellants' Brief at 4-5), created an actual 
controversy between the parties in this action who are 
asserting adverse claims under Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21. See 
Baird v. State. 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978) (The conditions 
of a declaratory action are satisfied if "there is an actual 
conflict between interested parties asserting adverse claims 
on an accrued state of facts as opposed to a hypothetical 
state of facts."). Moreover, the issues between the parties 
to this case are ripe since Payson is currently using, and 
attempting to uphold, a state statute to prohibit the 
Taxpayers from exercising their state and federal 
constitutional rights to petition (by referendum or repeal 
initiative) their grievances and to engage in free speech. 
Mever v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 108 S. Ct. 1886 (1988). Thus, 
contrary to Payson's assertions, (Appellees' Brief at 16), all 
the conditions to maintain a declaratory action are met and 
this action is justiciable.8 
8 Declaratory judgments should be liberally granted under this statute. 
Four conditions are generally Imposed to maintain a declaratory 
action: (1) a justiciable controversy; (2) the interest of the 
parties must be adverse; (3) the party seeking such relief must have 
a legally protectible interest in the controversy; and (4) the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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In addition, and again contrary to the Payson's 
assertions, (Appellees' Brief at 17-21), a declaratory action 
seeking a determination of a party's rights under a particular 
constitutional provision and a particular statute cannot 
become moot when the constitutional provision and statute are 
still in effect and the party's rights are subject to actual 
dispute. See Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 
1987) (en banc), aff'd 486 U.S. 414 (1988); see also Energy 
Research Found, v. Foote. 628 P.2d 173 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) 
(action seeking declaration of a party's rights under 
Nonresidential Buildings Act became moot when the Act was 
repealed); Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 
121 (Utah 1977) (declaratory judgment action should proceed if 
it ''appear[s] either that there is actual controversy, or that 
there is a substantial likelihood that one will develop so 
that adjudication will serve a useful purpose in resolving or 
avoiding controversy or possible litigation*). 
In the present case there is both an actual 
controversy and the likelihood that entry of a declaratory 
judgment will resolve future controversy. (Appellants' Brief 
at 14-16). Even if Taxpayers could be viewed as being barred 
by Utah Code Ann. S 20-11-24(1) from filing a referendum 
petition against Payson's new municipal tax scheme, they would 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
issues between the parties must be ripe for judicial determination. 
Baird v. State. 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978). 
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not be precluded by that s e c t i o n from bringing a repeal 
i n i t i a t i v e against the same tax scheme. See Op. Utah At t 'y 
Gen. (Apr. 16, 1987) (1988 I n i t i a t i v e s seeking Tax spending 
Limitat ions , Tax Reductions and Income Tax Credit for Private 
Education) ("a s t a t u t e may be repealed by means of the 
i n i t i a t i v e " (quoting Klosterman v. Marsh. 143 N.W.2d 744 (Neb. 
1966 ) ) ) ; see a l s o City of Fairbanks v . Fairbanks Convention & 
V i s i t o r s Bureau. 818 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1991) (holding that an 
i n i t i a t i v e which would repeal a motel and hote l tax was not an 
unconst i tu t iona l attempt t o repeal an appropriat ion) . 9 
Because the Taxpayers can bring a repeal i n i t i a t i v e 
against the very same municipal tax scheme that they sought t o 
re fer in the f i r s t ins tance , entry of a declaratory judgment 
in t h i s case i s proper because i t w i l l r e so lve future 
controversy. Nonetheless , there i s an actual d ispute between 
the p a r t i e s in t h i s case as t o whether Utah Code Ann. 
§ 20-11-21 prevents the Taxpayers from referr ing or repeal ing 
a new municipal tax scheme. Thus, contrary t o Payson's 
9 In Cltv of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention & Visi tors Bureau, "the 
c i ty cert if ied for inclusion on the general e lect ion ba l lo t a voter 
in i t ia t ive to create a new arrangement for allocating [motel and 
hotel] tax revenues." 818 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1991). The defendants 
challenged the inclusion of the municipal tax repeal i n i t i a t i v e on 
the elect ion ba l lo t by seeking declaratory and injunctive r e l i e f on 
the grounds that the in i t ia t ive was an unconst i tut ional attempt to 
repeal an appropriation. The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that 
although the in i t ia t ive by "its own language" repealed the bed tax, 
i t was not an unconstitutional appeal of an appropriation and thus 
was properly included on the election ballot . Id. at 1155-56. 
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assertions, Taxpayers' declaratory action is properly before 
this Court and should have been decided by the lower court. 
Payson cites both Sullivan v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Arapahoe County, 692 P.2d 1106 (Colo. 1984), 
and Goose Hollow Foothills League v. City of Portland. 650 
P.2d 135 (Or. Ct. App. 1982), for the proposition that Utah 
Code Ann. S 20-11-24(1) extends to actions for declaratory 
relief. (Appellees' Brief at 14-15). Section 20-11-24(1), 
however, only bars the filing of referendum petitions after 
thirty days have elapsed from the passage of an ordinance. 
This limitations period does not apply to actions for relief 
from inappropriate government action under Utah's Initiative 
and Referendum laws, i.e., the refusal to accept an 
application for petition copies. See id. 
Furthermore, Utah has always taken the position, as 
expressly provided in the Declaratory Judgment Act, that the 
Act "'is to be liberally construed and administered'» for the 
purpose of (1) resolving an actual controversy, or 
(2) resolving or avoiding future controversy or litigation 
when there is a substantial likelihood that such controversy 
or litigation will occur. Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 
570 P.2d 119, 121 (Utah 1977) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-
12 (1953)).10 More importantly, this Court has stated "the 
10 The issues presented in this case are likely to recur and evade 
review. In Mever v. Grant, the United States Court declared that a 
plaintiff's initiative action was not moot even though the time for 
filing the petition and the time for the general election on the 
petition had passed, because the six month time period for obtaining 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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court wi l l be indulgent in entertaining actions brought to 
[resolve controversy]; and more particularly so, where there 
i s a substantial public interest to be served by the 
settlement of such an issue.* I£ . 
The presence of substantial public interest1 1 as 
evidenced by the intervention of an amicus curiae, the 
opportunity for future controversy over the same municipal tax 
scheme through the f i l ing of a repeal i n i t i a t i v e and the 
actual controversy over whether Utah Code Ann. § 21-11-21 
prevents the Taxpayers from referring or repealing a new 
municipal tax scheme indicate that th i s case i s the proper 
subject of a declaratory action. Thus, th i s Court should rule 
that the Taxpayers are ent i t led to a declaratory judgment that 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
p e t i t i o n s ignatures was too short for completion of the subject 
l i t i g a t i o n and because the taxpayers were l i k e l y to be subjected to 
the same act ion again. This rule of lav i s determinative in t h i s 
case . As in Meyer. the one month time period for obtaining p e t i t i o n 
signatures i s too short for the completion of the l i t i g a t i o n and the 
Taxpayers in t h i s act ion are l i k e l y to be subject to the same 
p e t i t i o n r e j e c t i o n in the future. 
11 Utah lav provides that Utah courts may l i t i g a t e an i s s u e , vhich may be 
t echn ica l l y moot, i f there i s a strong public i n t e r e s t in the i s s u e . 
Wickham v. Fisher. 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981). In Wickham, t h i s 
Court s tated that vhere a matter g ives ''rise to cons t i tu t iona l 
i s sues" there i s a strong public i n t e r e s t to reso lve the i s s u e s . 
Id. In Olson v. Sal t Lake Citv School D i s t r i c t . 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 
1986) t h i s Court found that a l o c a l budgetary i s sue that af fected 
the property tax m i l l levy vas of s u f f i c i e n t public importance that 
i t should be resolved j u d i c i a l l y . The present matter involves a 
cons t i tu t iona l i s sue of the people 's r ight to p e t i t i o n government on 
tax l e g i s l a t i o n and engage in free speech, t h i s i s sue i s of great 
public importance and should be j u d i c i a l l y resolved by t h i s court. 
- 1 7 -
they may bring a referendum or repeal initiative against a new 
municipal tax scheme. 
C Approval Of The Pressurized Irrigation System 
Bond Did Not Ratify The Payson City Utility Tax. 
Passage of the irrigation bond resolution did not 
ratify the Utility Tax.12 The question placed before the 
people by the irrigation resolution essentially was "do you 
want us to spend your tax money repaying this bond issue.* 
This question is entirely different from that presented by the 
referendum petition. The petition question is "do we want to 
raise additional taxes via a Utility Tax." 
Ratification by the electorate can only occur if the 
question presented for ratification is specific and identical 
to the question originally passed. Ratification cannot occur 
by inference. Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply 
Sys., 691 P.2d 524, 537 (Wash. 1984) cert, denied. 471 U.S . 
1065 cert, denied. 471 U.S. 1075 (1985); McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations. S 29.109 (3d. 1990); see generally Lawrence v. 
City of Concord. 320 P.2d 215, 218 (Cal. 1958). Because 
legislative acts are frequently multifaceted, it is impossible 
to accurately determine whether the legislative body ratified 
a particular item discussed in the law, unless the 
ratification of the item is specific. Consequently, 
12 It is disingenuous for the Payson to argue that they have always interpreted 
Utah Code Ann. 8 20-11-21 as not allowing the people the right to vote on 
"any tax levy" and then claim that they intended to give the people the 
opportunity to ratify the Utility Tax by voting for the irrigation bonds. 
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" [ r a t i f i c a t i o n by inference i s an ambiguous rule and 
dangerous doctrine" because i t requires the court t o "second 
guess" why the e l e c t o r a t e adopted the a c t . Chemical Bank, 691 
P.2d at 537. 
The a u t h o r i t i e s Payson c i t e s for i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n 
contention are inappos i te . The cases of Appeal of Sanborn 
Regional School Board. 579 A.2d 283 (N.H. 1990),1 3 Tvler v. 
Common School D i s t r i c t No. 7 6 . . 298 P.2d 215 (Kan. 1956),1 4 
and Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Independent School D i s t r i c t No, 
35# 193 N.W. 949 (Minn. 1923),1 5 c i t e d by the Payson, confirm 
that r a t i f i c a t i o n has t o be s p e c i f i c . 
13 In Sanborn. the electorate voted to increase teachers salaries . The court 
ruled that this vote did not ratify a col lect ive bargaining agreement 
previously entered into by the school board to raise the teachers salaries 
for three consecutive years. To ratify the three year agreement, the 
voters had to be forewarned that a vote for a one year raise could mean 
approval of raises for the second and third years. 
14 In Tvler. the school d is tr ic t presented a single, compound question to the 
voters that asked whether they wanted to issue bonds to build a school on 
a particular parcel of ground. Because the resolution did not give the 
people the opportunity to separately vote as to whether they wanted the 
bonds and as to whether they wanted the school on the particular parcel, 
the resolution was i l l ega l . Nonetheless, upon a favorable vote at the 
election, the d is tr ic t issued bonds. To cure the problems of the f i r s t 
election, the school d is tr ic t held a second, special election and 
"submitted a ballot to the people that offered the voters of the distr ict 
an opportunity to vote on each [ i ssue] ." The court ruled that the 
favorable passage of the two specific questions at the second election 
ratif ied the prior election and any bonds that had be previously issued. 
15 In Oliver, the school d is tr ic t entered into contracts to build new schools. 
At a subsequent election, the voters expressly ratif ied the school 
d i s t r i c t ' s actions by voting to accept the contracts. 
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IV. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 20-11-21(2) ONLY BARS THE REFERRAL 
OF THE PROPERTY TAX MILL LEVY. IT DOES NOT PREVENT 
THE REFERRAL OF THE UTILITY TAX. 
Utah Code Ann. SS 20-11-1 to 20-11-25 implement the 
people's constitutional right to refer "any legislation," and 
provides Taxpayers a statutory cause of action against Payson 
for not issuing the petition copies. Payson alleges that they 
did not violate § 20-11-11 because the use of the term "tax 
levy" is not ambiguous in S 20-11-21(2), and thus this Section 
bars the referral and initiative of all tax levies whether 
they are legislative in nature or not. Not only is this 
position unsupportable because it gives the statute an 
unconstitutional interpretation, but also because Payson's own 
memorandum confirms that the use of "tax levy" is ambiguous. 
On page 27 of its Brief, Payson claims that "tax 
levy" means the "action of a legislative body [in] determining 
and declaring that a tax . . . shall be imposed. . . . " A tax 
levy is "not merely [a] ministerial action." (Appellees' 
Brief at 27). Despite Payson's initial conviction that "tax 
levy" has only one meaning and is legislative in nature, 
Payson quickly recanted and just 13 pages later (Appellees' 
Brief at 40-41) states that "tax levies," such as the Utility 
Tax, are not really legislative acts that exact a tax; but 
rather, are "administrative" acts by which the executive 
merely performs the ministerial task of assessing the proper 
rate for a previously approved tax. 
-20-
Payson attempts t o combine other "tax l e v i e s " within 
the scope of s e c t i o n 20-11-21(2) by claiming that "budget" and 
"tax levy" are inex tr i cab ly intertwined and cannot be 
separated. This i s erroneous.1 6 
While taxes provide revenue that i s considered in the 
budget, most tax s t a t u t e s , e . g . , income tax , franchise tax , 
s a l e s tax , are separate ly enacted and separate ly repealed. 
The r a t e s of these taxes do not change because the expected 
budgetary expenditures go up or down. Moreover, some of these 
tax l e v i e s are not even enacted by the c i t y . In short , most 
tax l e v i e s are l e g i s l a t i v e ac t s that are independent of any 
par t i cu lar annual budget. The only tax that i s determined by 
each annual budget i s the property tax m i l l l evy . The ra te 
for t h i s tax v a r i e s each year and i s determined by a s ta tutory 
formula whose independent var iab les are the value of property 
in the county and the expected budget expenditures for the tax 
year. The ra te so s e t i s purely an administrat ive function 
16 When o r i g i n a l l y enacted in 1985, Utah Code Ann. §§ 20-11-21 and 20-11-
27 (1985) excluded three d i s t i n c t types of measures from re ferra l : 
"a budget, m i l l l evy , or zoning ordinance." In 1987, the 
l e g i s l a t u r e deleted zoning ordinances because court dec is ions had 
determined that at l e a s t some zoning ordinances were l e g i s l a t i v e in 
nature. Transcript. Senate Floor Debate on Utah Senate B i l l 9, 1987 
at 3 . At that same time "mill levy" was changed to "tax l evy ." This 
changed in nomenclature was not Intended to change the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21. §ee i d . at 10 (even though the b i l l was 
amended to read "tax l evy ," the l e g i s l a t o r s continued to explain 
that "in i t s now amended form," the b i l l says you can't have a 
referendum on "a m i l l levy or a budget"). I t should a l so be noted 
that in an e f for t to remove archaic language, the term "mill" was 
changed to "tax" throughout the Tax Code as part of the 1987 Tax 
Recodif icat ion Act. 
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once the value of the taxable property and the amount of 
proposed expenditures are established. When the Utah 
legislature enacted Utah Code Ann, S 20-11-21(2) it only 
intended to preclude referenda against the property tax mill 
levy. Any other reading of "tax levy* would cause § 20-11-
21(2) to violate Utah Const, art. VI, § 1. 
Moreover, as discussed in the Appellants Brief at 
17-22, the Utility Tax satisfies the Supreme Courts three 
tests for being legislative in nature: (1) it makes a new law, 
(2) it is permanent in nature and (3) it is the means of 
accomplishing a general public purpose. Payson attempts to 
rebut this conclusion by citing Penman v. Ouin. 116 S.W. 2d 
783 (Tex. Ct. App. 1938). Penman is not on point. Indeed, 
the Penman court went through the three tests used in Utah and 
found that the tax levy at issue in that case was 
administrative in nature; however, the tax levy involved in 
Penman was the a£ valorem property tax mill levy. This is the 
very "tax levy" Taxpayers have said is administrative and 
subject to the referendum bar of S 20-11-21(2).17 
Because "tax levy" may denote the legislative 
enactment of a new tax scheme or the administrative act of 
setting a rate for a pre-existing tax, it is necessary to 
review the intent of the legislature and give the statute a 
17 The property tax mill levy Is administrative because (1) it does not make 
new lav, it merely sets the rate for an existing property tax law; (2) it 
is not permanent because its rates change every year; and (3) it does not 
declare a particular public purpose as the object of its enactment. 
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constitutional construction if possible. As explained in 
Appellants' Brief at 34-37, the legislative intent of the 
statute reveals that "tax levy" means the property tax mill 
levy. Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21(2) does not 
prevent the referral of the Utility Tax. 
CONCLUSION 
Finally, Payson makes much "a to do" about how a 
"handful of citizens who obtain enough signatures" could 
disrupt the efficient administration of a city if they could 
refer a budget or a tax levy. This statement is misleading 
for the reasons set forth below and almost sounds despotic. 
First, the Utah Constitution was created by and for 
the "people" and, as such, the people retained the right to 
legislate through referenda and initiatives. Utah Const, 
art. VI, § 1. The "handful" of people required to refer 
legislation is more than Payson would have the Court believe. 
As many as 30% of the voters of a city may have to sign a 
petition to place it on a ballot. See Utah Code Ann. 
20-11-22. If this many voters desire to review the issue, 
perhaps the elected officials need to listen to the people. 
"Government, after all, belongs to the people it serves." 
Wilson v. Manning. 657 P.2d 251, 256 (Utah 1982) (Howe, J. and 
Durham, J., dissenting). 
Second, our cities functioned efficiently for over 92 
years without the unconstitutional limitations of Utah Code 
Ann. § 20-11-21(2). The only restriction on the referral and 
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initiative right prior to 1985 was the constitutional 
requirement that the matter be legislative in nature. 
Interestingly, none of our cities were forced to ruin by the 
people during that time period. Why? — because the people 
rarely engaged in the substantial effort of a referendum 
unless there was truly an egregious new tax, and when they did 
make the effort to challenge a new tax they got the attention 
of their elected officials and the situation was remedied. 
Third, this case does not cause the city budget to 
sit in limbo for months waiting for a general election 
because: (1) this case does not concern a budget, (2) cities 
have the express authority to call a special election for a 
referendum, See Utah Code Ann. S 20-5-3, (3) the Utility Tax 
deals with a tax that was enacted in March and could have been 
resolved before it needed to be considered as a revenue source 
in the budget for the payment of capital improvements to the 
golf course, and (4) the Utility Tax is relatively small and 
any amounts not received under the Utility Tax could have been 
compensated for by making a small adjustment in the mill levy. 
For the above reasons, Taxpayers request that the 
Court reverse the District Court's December 2, 1990 Summary 
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Judgment and enter an order pursuant to the request made in 
their Opening Brief. 
DATED this 15th day of June, 1992. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
Maijrk K. Buchi 
David J. Crapo 
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STATEMENT OP FACTS 
The statement of Essential Facts on Appeal by the 
CONPOR is remarkable in several ways. Amicus CONPOR Brief 
(hereinafter "CONPOR Brief") at 2-3. There are no citations 
to the trial record. Several "facts" mentioned are not of 
record in this case (whether true or not) and many are 
irrelevant— for example, the defendant/appellee, St. 
George-Dixie Lodge #1743, Benevolent and Protective Order of 
Elks (hereinafter the "Lodge" or the "Elks Lodge") has an 
"occupancy permit" for its building and a "health permit" 
for its dining facility, the Lodge does not receive public 
funds, the Lodge's building is not on public property, the 
Lodge gets its electricity and water from the municipal 
systems, etc.1 Given its displayed lack of knowledge of the 
1
 Perhaps these "facts" were just left on a word 
processor from when CONPOR filed an amicus brief in some 
other case. Similarly, CONPOR's lengthy discussion of 
"state action" (CONPOR Amicus Brief, pp. 5-12) seems to be 
taken from another brief and shoved into CONPOR's brief 
herein. "State action," which might be relevant under a 
14th Amendment analysis in federal court, is not relevant in 
this case. 
CONPOR also seems to think that plaintiff wants the 
Court to order the state to remove or deny defendant a 
liquor license (Id., p. 4; p. 5; p. 17) plaintiff has not so 
requested in this action. Denial of or the removal of the 
defendant's liquor licenses has never been an issue. 
Needless to say if the St. George Elks Lodge were to 
give up its state liquor and beer licenses, it would no 
longer be "an enterprise regulated by the state" subject to 
the Utah Civil Rights Act. The Civil Rights Act would then 
2 
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^l^s Lodge is a "business estabi^ux 
enterprises regulated by the state. U.C.A. §§ 13-7-1, et 
seq. (1953 as amended). The Lodge — engaged in public and 
commercial activities — is a business establishment for the 
purposes of the Act. In addition, as the beneficiary of 
state beer and liquor licenses, the Lodge is an enterprise 
regulated by the state. 
Accordingly, the Elks Lodge cannot legitimately plead 
exemption to Utah's civil rights legislation. The Lodge has 
long forsaken any claims of intimacy and private association 
by actively seeking and accepting state licenses to sell 
beer and alcohol and by offering its facilities and services 
to the public. Far from occurring in surroundings analogous 
one's home and amongst individuals who share relationship 
similar to family members, the gender discrimination 
practiced by the Elks Lodge takes place publicly, commer-
cially and pervasively. 
Finally, given the distinct trend in other juris-
dictions to prevent male-only clubs from excluding women as 
members, application of the Utah Civil Rights Act to the 
Elks Lodge is over due. Importantly, civil rights 
legislation with narrower sweeps and less exacting texts 
than the Utah statute has been repeatedly interpreted as 
prohibiting the exclusionary membership policies adopted by 
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 Interestingly, CONPOR cites only federal cases in 
its amicus brief, seeming to ignore that this is a state 
claim brought in state court under Utah's unique state civil 
rights statute. 
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legislation enacted pursuant to Utah/s authority to police 
the health and safety of its citizens. Such regulatory 
"police" power clearly belongs to Utah. In any case, the 
Lodge has not challenged the authority of the state to 
prohibit discrimination and defends itself in this action by 
maintaining that the Utah Civil Rights Act was not intended 
to reach Elk Lodge activities. 
The Utah Attorney General, as a statutory party to this 
action, also confirms that "state action" is not relevant to 
this case: 
Although Utah could probably show "state action" 
in its farther .reaching involvement as an active 
market participant in the liquor industry, it is a 
completely different question of whether Utah may 
prohibit discrimination, as an additional 
regulation upon the liquor industry as part of its 
police powers. 
Brief of Attorney General at 18 (emphasis original).3 Ms. 
Beynon's claim has never rested upon state action and the 
application of federal anti-discrimination protections, but 
3
 As the Attorney General points out in his Brief, the 
Lodge shares CONPOR's confusion of the issues in this case. 
Many of the Lodge's arguments for exemption from Utah's 
antidiscrimination statute mistakenly rely upon federal 
civil rights claims that are ultimately decided upon the 
matter of state action. Because the question of state 
action is not before this Court, the relevancy of these is 
cases is minimal. See, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Ivris, 407 
U.S. 124 (1972) (a state licensing scheme insufficient state 
action for the purposes of federal equal protection law). 
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 In arguing that there is no state action in this 
case, CONPOR advances other unpersuasive contentions. For 
example, the amicus contends that a practicing attorney 
presumably in Utah -- can refuse to represent a client for 
any discriminatory reason. CONPOR fails to realize that the 
Utah Civil Rights Act specifically prohibits an attorney 
from discriminating against clients on the basis of an 
invidious classification. A practicing attorney in Utah is 
a business establishment and her office is a place of public 
accommodation for the purposes of the Utah Civil Rights Act 
and her conduct is subject to the state's antidiscrimi-
nation mandate. 
Oddly, CONPOR also warns (or imagines) that application 
of the Utah Civil Rights Act to the Lodge would open 
religious organizations to regulation by the state. 
CONPOR's Brief at 10. Again the amicus exhibits 
unfamiliarity with Utah's civil rights legislation which 
specifically exempts churches from the reach of the statute. 
U.C.A. § 13-7-3 (1953 as amended). 
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substantial sums of money by selling liquor, beer and food, 
running what is essentially a public restaurant, and renting 
its facilities to the public. The Lodge's business-like 
traits — including its utilization of its state liquor and 
beer licenses — coupled with its solicitation and 
acceptance of state regulation indicate that the Elks Lodge 
is well within the reach of Utah's anti-discrimination 
edict.5 
5
 Throughout its brief, C0NP0R repeatedly stresses 
that a liquor license issued to a "private" club such as the 
Lodge, is a substantial benefit to the club. Indeed, C0NP0R 
would consider the denial or cancellation of this license to 
be akin to punishment of the Lodge. .CONPOR Brief at 4-5 
(for example, "Plaintiff and the Attorney General do not 
seek redress but punishment of the Lodge by imposition of a 
financial hardship through removal of their [sic] liquor 
license." ) (emphasis added). CONPOR's admission underlines 
the extent to which the Lodge is a beneficiary of state 
privileges and state regulation and the extent to which 
these privileges are essential to the economic well-being of 
the Lodge. CONPOR's emphasis upon the importance of the 
Lodge's commercial nature — centered around the selling of 
beer and alcohol — only reaffirms Ms. Beynon's assertion 
that the Lodge is a business. In addition, CONPOR points 
out that the commercial success of the Lodge is dependent on 
a state privilege. Because Utah lawmakers determined that 
whenever extensive state regulation entangle the state in 
the affairs of the monitored enterprise — and CONPOR points 
out how extensive and important this entanglement is — 
discrimination could not be tolerated for fear that this 
undesirable conduct would be encourage by or associated with 
the state's presence and support. 
When CONPOR suggests that Ms. Beynon is seeking to 
punish the Lodge, CONPOR is in error. Ms. Beynon seeks 
redress only in the form of injunctive and declaratory 
relief, not in the form of money damages. Ms. Beynon is 
only asking this Court to enforce the law and put an end to 
the Lodge's invidious discrimination. 
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 CONPOR asserts without citation to any authority 
that enterprises regulated by the state "must be considered 
in connection with the more limiting language describing 
business establishments and places of public accommodation." 
CONPOR Brief at 1 5. Yet, CONPOR fails to note that the 
statute does not limit or define "business establishments" 
in any way. Indeed, the similar absence of a definition or 
a listing of examples of "business establishments" prompted 
the California Supreme Court to interpret the term as 
broadly as reasonably possible, Burks v. Poppy Construction 
Company, 3 7 0 P.2 d 313 (Ca1. 19 6 2) . 
7
 CONPOR argues that the Lodge is not an enterprise 
regulated by the state by pointing to supposed contra-
dictions in the Attorney General's Brief. First, CONPOR 
misstates the Attorney General's position, wrongly insisting 
that the Attorney General "acknowledged that the Lodge is 
not a * business' within the meaning of the term *business 
establishment' because it is not open to the public and is 
not operated for profit,11 CONPOR Brief at 16, Actually, 
the Attorney General merely noted that the definition of 
"business establishments" would include "all profit 
motivated or commercially oriented entities , ,l1 Indeed, 
the Attorney General then argued that the Lodge is a 
9 
If CONPOR's less than reflective interpretation of the 
Utah Civil Rights Act were adopted, the legislative intent 
to have the Act construed liberally would be frustrated. In 
addition, the 1973 amendment to the Utah Civil Rights Act, 
meant to extend the application of the act to enterprises 
regulated by the state, would be made superfluous. Because 
the Act before 1973 already prohibited discrimination in 
"all business establishments," the new provision including 
enterprises regulated by the state must be read as expanding 
the scope of Utah's civil rights legislation beyond business 
establishments. Accordingly, "business" for the purpose of 
state regulation after 1973 cannot be limited to those 
"business establishments" subject to the Act prior to 1973. 
By expanding the scope of Utah's civil rights 
legislation in 1973 to reach enterprises regulated by the 
state, Utah lawmakers expressed deep concern thcit invidious 
discrimination not be associated with state regulation, 
authorization or privilege. Lawmakers determined that when 
discrimination has the appearance of state assistance or 
"business" for the purposes § 13-7-2 (3)b of the Utah Civil 
Rights Act. Brief of Attorney General, pp. 6 et. seq. 
Second, CONPOR ignores Ms. Beynon's extensive arguments and 
references to state case law which indicate that the term 
"business establishment" includes more than just profit 
motivated entities open to the general public. Appellant's 
Reply Brief at 12-20. 
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corporation, a "business establishment'); O'Connor v. 
Village Green Owners Association, 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983) 
(condominium association, a non-profit association, a 
"business establishment"); Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa 
Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985) (Boys' Club, a private, 
non-profit corporation, affiliated with the Boys' Club of 
America, a "business establishment"); Curran v. Mount Diablo 
Council of Boy Scouts, 195 Cal.Rptr. 325 (Cal.App.2 Dist. 
1983) (Boy Scouts, a non-profit organization a "business 
establishment"); Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 
262 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Cal.App.l Dist. 1989) (a non-profit, 
privately owned and operated, social and recreational club a 
"business establishment"); Lloyds Lions Club v. Int. 
Association of Lions Clubs, 724 P.2d 887 (Or.App. 1986), 
petition for review dismissed, 740 P.2d 182 (Or. 1987) 
(nonprofit, private, selective membership club). 
As are the various organizations involved in the 
foregoing cases, the Lodge is a non-profit, membership 
organization that is a business for the purposes of the 
relevant civil rights legislation. The Lodge exhibits 
enough of the characteristics of a commercial enterprise, 
and is sufficiently open to the public to constitute a 
business. In addition to its state licenses to sell beer 
and alcohol, the Lodge has a St. George City business 
12 
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d e c i s i o n a t t a c h e d a s F:>:hibi4 "D" . T h i s rul ing was >:dsed 
'i :: f t::l: le Roche : 
Lodge. Ever i though the Michigan Civi 1 Rights Act prohibits 
MSA 3.548(10] ) , et seq. 
discrimination only in places of public accommodation "whose 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise 
made available to the public," MCL 37.2301(a) (emphasis 
added), the Court had no difficulty in finding that the 
Rochester Lodge was a place of public accommodation. Id. at 
A.7. Significant to the Court's conclusion was that the 
Lodge "operated a de facto restaurant." Jd. The Lodge also 
held weekly bingo games and an annual craft show open to the 
public, id. Also contributing to the Court's determination 
that the Rochester Lodge dining facility was essentially 
public was the observation, that although the Rochester Lodge 
dining room was theoretically open only to members and their 
guests, food and drinks were ordered and paid for without a 
showing of membership. IdL at A.5 
Like its Rochester counterpart, the St. George Elks 
Lodge is an open and commercial enterprise. The St. George 
Lodge's dining and banguet facilities are open for private 
and business functions to its members, their families, their 
employers and their guests. Appellant's Brief at 11. In 
addition to serving food and beverages to lodge customers, 
the Elks Lodge is used for receptions, business meetings and 
parties and defendant rents the facility to the public for 
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9
 For a non-member to rent the facility, she or he 
need only be sponsored by a. member who must be present 
during the event, 
1,1
 '" The Schellenberg case now on appeal was argued 
before the Michigan Court of Appeals on November 4, 1992, 
Case Nos. l^*" 7^ l^Z^^lf. 
or expressive association. For many of the same reasons 
that the Lodge is an enterprise regulated by the state and 
is a business enterprise, it has relinquished any status as 
a truly private club. As emphasized above, the Lodge 
maintains a public and commercial profile, profiting from 
the state licensed sale of beer and liquor and from the 
rental of its facilities to the public. Because the Lodge 
has opened itself to state regulation, it cannot simultan-
eously claim immunity from state anti-discrimination 
supervision. 
Further factors confirm that the Lodge is not entitled 
to First Amendment protection — the Lodge is not a small, 
intimate, selective organization. The United State Supreme 
Court has consistently held that the essence of privacy is 
selectivity. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Associ-
ation, 410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting 
Park, 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969). If there is little or no 
selectivity in a club/s membership, there is no basis to 
claim privacy. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609 (1984); Bd. of Directors of Rotary International v. 
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). The Lodge has the burden 
of establishing that its is deserves First Amendment 
protection. United States Power Squadrons v. State Human 
Rights Appeal Bd., 542 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (NY 1983) ("[Club 
16 
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 The Michigan court found no difficulty in. 
distinguishing Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of 
the Elks, 382 F.Supp 1182 (D.Conn 1974), which found a 
Connecticut Elks Lodge to be a private club under federal 
civil rights law. In Cornelius there was no evidence to 
counter the claim by the Connecticut Lodge that its 
membership procedure was genuinely selective. Rochester 
Lodge at A.8; Cornelius at 1204, Cornelius also predated, 
by a decade, the Roberts, supra, and Rotary, supra, 
decisions, in which the United States Supreme Court examined 
the size, purpose, policies, selectivity and other relevant 
characteristics of each club. In contrast, the Michigan 
Court noted that Ms. Schellenberg had introduced convincing 
documentation that the Rochester Lodge was not a genuinely 
membership standards, the Michigan Court noted that 
"[n]early all of the applicants who follow though with the 
[membership] process are accepted." Id. at A.4. 
Significantly, the Rochester Lodge had 1,800 member, and 
over the part 15 years, only 20 applicants had been 
rejected. Id. 
Like the Rochester Lodge, the St. George Lodge is an 
organization with a large membership and without a genuinely 
selective membership procedure. Like the Rochester Lodge, 
the St. George Lodge is not a truly private club. Although 
the Elks Lodges list ten (10) characteristics as its 
membership standards, these criteria are not applied to 
create a selective, intimate organization. Most, if not 
all, men who apply are allowed to join the Lodge. Three St. 
George Elks Lodge members testified that during their thirty 
one (31), thirty eight (38), and twenty nine (29) years of 
membership, they witnessed respectively, the rejection of no 
applications, maybe ten (10) applications and one (1) 
application for membership. Appellant's Brief at 8. From 
January, 1987 through June, 1989, the St. George Elks Lodge 
members approved every application for membership presented 
to them. Id. During those two and one half years, the 
selective club. Rochester Lodge at A.8. For further 
discussion of Cornelius, see Appellant's Brief at 9-12. 
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investigation committee, whose duty it was to review the 
qualifications of all applicants, never issued a negative 
report oh any applicant. Id. 
Nor is the St. George Lodge a small and intimate 
association. While about ten percent (10%) of the 
membership drops out of the organization each year, the 
Lodge annually increases its membership by fifteen percent 
(15%). Appellants Brief at 8-9. At various. Lodge 
meetings, Ledge members are repeatedly encouraged to recruit 
new membership. Ld. Although the St. George Elks Lodge can 
have members only from Washington County, Utah and small 
adjoining areas of Nevada and Arizona, the lodge enjoys a 
large membership of more than one thousand (1,000+) men. 
Id. This figure represents more than 6% of the male 
population in Washington County and more than 8% of the male 
population in St. George City. Id. There is no limit on 
the number of men that can be members of the Elks Lodge. 
Because the Lodge has not conducted itself as a truly 
private club, it cannot claim First Amendment immunity from 
the reach of the Utah Civil Rights Act. Rather than 
maintaining selective membership standards, the Lodge has 
solicited a large membership and has admitted virtually 
every male that has wished to join. By offering its 
facilities for rent and by running a restaurant in which 
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non-members can purchase food and alcohol, the Lodge has 
opened itself to the public and lost any basis for a claim 
of protected privacy. Finally, the Lodge has accepted state 
licenses to sell beer and alcohol, voluntarily submitting to 
government supervision which necessarily falls upon the 
beneficiaries of these state privileges. No truly private 
organization invites a state regulating body into its inner 
sanctum. 
CONCLUSION 
The St. George Elks Lodge is not insulated from the 
reach of the Utah Civil Rights Act. Utah has determined 
that individuals and our society are entitled to be free 
from the poisonous effects of unlawful discrimination. The 
Lodge has chosen to openly participate in our society, 
offering its services and facilities to the public, 
soliciting state benefits and profiting from state 
privileges. Yet, when asked to abide by the state enacted 
antidiscrimination law which serves the health and welfare 
of this society, suddenly the Lodge wants out. The Lodge 
does not want to treat the individuals who make up our 
society with equal respect. The Lodge wants to openly and 
unabashedly deny Ms. Beynon access to its goods, services 
and benefits simply because she is a women. This 
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discrimination is unfair, undesirable, and most importantly, 
unlawful. 
For these reasons and in the interest of justice, this 
Court should reverse the ruling and decision of the trial 
court, determine that the Utah Civil Rights Act applies to 
the Lodge and remand this case with instructions to the 
trial court to enter judgment in favor of Ms. Beynon 
granting declaratory and injunctive relief to end the 
illegal gender discrimination practiced by the Lodge. 
DATED this 13th day of NOVEMBER, 1992. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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EXHIBIT 
OPINION IN 
SCHELLENBERG VS. ROCHESTER, MICHIGAN ELKS LODGE 
CIRCUIT COURT FOR OAKLAND COUNTY, MICHIGAN 
CASE NO. 88-351-793 NZ 
NOVEMBER 15, 1989 
STATE OF MICHIGAN 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF OAKLAND 
SHARON*LEE SCHELLENBERG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROCHESTER, MICHIGAN LODGE NO. 2225 
OF THE BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE 
ORDER OF ELKS OF THE USA, a non-
profit Michigan corporation, 
Defendants• 
/ 
O P I N I O N 
This Court has before it the parties' motion for 
a judgment on stipulated facts. MCR 2.116(A). Plaintiff brine 
this action under Section 302 of the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rightc 
Act, MCL 37.101, et se£, MSA 3.548(101), et se£, alleging that 
she has been denied full and equal enjoyment of the services 
of a place of public accommodation or public service because 
of sex. Defendant admits that it has refused plaintiff members 
in its organization but argues that it is not a place of public 
accommodation or public service as those terms are defined 
in the Act. Rather, defendant argues that it is a private 
club under Sec. 303 and therefore, exempt from the provisions 
of Sec. 302. 
Plaintiff is a realtor in the City of Rochester. 
For approximately seven years prior to this litigation she 
had enjoyed some of the defendant's services and facilities^ 
Plaintiff frequently ate lunch in the defendant's dining room 
on work days with business associates. The local Board of 
Realtors often rents the defendant's facility for its meetings, 
which plaintiff attends. Plaintiff also takes her mother to 
the Elks Club for bingo on Wednesday nights. Plaintiff testif-
Civil Action 
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that she ate at defendant's club so frequently that the doorperson 
would let her in without her showing any proof that her husband 
was a member. 
In February, 1988, plaintiff completed a written 
application for membership naming a sponsor member and two 
member references. Plaintiff wanted to join the Elks primarily 
because it was a convenient and customary place for lunch on 
weekdays* Also, it was an appropriate place where she could 
take her parents for dinner and dancing. It is not disputed 
that plaintiff's application was denied solely because she 
is female. 
Defendant is a local chapter of the Benevolent and 
Protective Order of Elks of the United States of America (BPOE). 
Defendant is incorporated in this state as a fraternal association 
pursuant to MCL 457.301; MSA 21.1291 and MCL 450.133; MSA 21.134. 
Pursuant to defendant's Articles of Incorporation, it was formed, 
"to inculcate the principals of Charity, Justice, Brotherly 
Love and Fidelity to promote the welfare and enhance the happiness 
of its members; to quicken the spirit of American patriotism; 
to cultivate good fellowship; to perpetuate itself as a fraternal 
organization; and to provide for its government.'* Defendant 
is a non-profit tax-exempt corporation. In its promotional 
brochure, What it Means to Be an Elk, pp 15-16, the Elks national 
office proclaims: 
The primary object of the Order is the 
practice of charity in its broadest 
significance, not merely that of alms 
giving. 
• * * 
For many years the aggregate 
expenditure* Of the Subordinate Lodges 
for charitable purposes have run into 
millions of dollars each year, covering 
humanitarian services of infinite variety. 
Among the «orf- ul of such activities 
may be mentic ^e following: food 
r * oi 
to the hungry; shelter for the homeless; 
clothing and fuel for the needy; milk 
for the under-nourished babies; medical 
attention to the sick; baskets to the 
poor at Christmas and Thanksgiving; 
outings for underprivileged children; 
entertainments for shut-ins; education 
for young people; artificial limbs for 
the maimed; hospital beds; free clinics; 
night schools. And the list might be 
indefinitely extended. 
All of the State Elks Associations 
have undertaken important and extensive 
charitable works within their own several 
jurisdictions, determined by the particular 
conditions therein existing and the 
preferences of their constituent members. 
They include rehabilitation of crippled 
children, treatment of indigent tubercular 
patients, provision for scholarships to 
worthy students, maintenance of orphans, 
boys' camps, training of the blind, 
eyeglasses for needy boys and girls, 
cerebral palsy clinics, cancer clinics, 
and other state wide projects of similar 
character and of equal worthiness, which 
are being carried on as continuing 
activities. No history of social service 
in the United States would be complete 
without an inspiring chapter devoted to 
the achievements of the Order of Elks in 
this field. 
Membership in the Elks is limited to male citizens 
of the United States of America not under the age of 21. Elks 
Constitution, Art VII, Sec 4. Potential members must also be 
believers in God and possess good moral character. Elks Annotated 
Statute, § 14.010. Communists and persons who advocate the 
overthrow of the government by force are not permitted to join. 
The Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks has about 
1.5 million members nationwide and about 50,000 members in 78 
lodges in this state. In August, 1988, the defendant had 1,84; 
members. In 1987, 126 men applied for membership with defendant. 
One was rejected and three withdrew their applications. In 
1986, 119 men applied for membership with the defendant. One 
was rejected because he was not- * United States citizen 
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and three withdrew their applications. In 1985, 117 men applied 
for membership. None were rejected though five withdrew their 
applications. During these most recent years less than two 
percent of all applicants were rejected. Over the past 15 
years only 20 applicants have been rejected. 
The defendant recruits new members primarily through 
members' social contacts. Members are encouraged in the monthly 
newsletter to seek new members from among their friends. The 
recruit submits an application naming the sponsor member and 
two member references. If the application indicates that the 
applicant meets the four basic membership requirements the 
applicant is invited to sit for an interview. The interview 
is fairly short and informal. One member of the investigating 
committee who performed interviews stated that throughout over 
100 interviews that he had performed, he had recommended every 
applicant for membership. The applicant is considered for 
membership by the members in a vote. Three negative votes 
results in rejection of the applicant. Nearly all of the 
applicants who follow through with the process are accepted. 
The defendant charges its new members an initiation 
fee of $75 and each member pays annual dues of $75. Dues and 
fees account for approximately 70% of defendant's annual receipts. 
Defendant's next largest source of income is from rental of 
its facilities to other organizations. For example, in 1987 
and 1988, defendant rented its facilities to about 20 different 
organizations on about 90 different occasions. In 1983, rentals 
accounted for approximately 13% of defendant's income. Defendant 
derives approximately nine percent of its income from weekly 
bingo nights and less than two percent of its income from 
advertisements placed in its local newsletter. Defendant operates 
a dining room or resta"Ufalfl& for its members and their guests 
but does not appear to derive a profit from this activity. 
The parties stipulated at oral argument that only 
three percent of the defendant's income is directed to charitable 
organizations and activities. Defendant contributes $1 per 
member annually to the statewide Michigan Elks :najor projects. 
Defendant sponsors an annual hoop shoot for local youths and 
assists a local law enforcement agency in its drug awareness 
program. 
The defendant operates a dining room as one of the 
services it provides to its members. According to the defendant's 
own rules, the dining room is supposed to be open only to members 
and their guests. Guests are not supposed to be allowed to 
purchase their own alcoholic beverages or food. However, before 
this litigation commenced these rules were not enforced. One 
of defendant's own waitresses, Janice Kline, stated that she 
regularly provided separate checks for guests who requested 
separate checks. She was never told not to do this. She also 
served food and drinks without requesting to see membership 
identification. Two of plaintiff's female business associates 
stated that they have used defendant's dining hall even though 
they were not members. No one in their group was ever asked 
to show identification. They all received separate checks 
and paid for their own meals. 
The issue before this Court is whether the defendant's 
decision to reject plaintiff's application solely on the basis 
of sex violated the Eliiot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Section 302 
of the Act provides: 
Sec. 302. Except where permitted 
by law, a person shall not: 
(a) Deny an individual the full 
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of a place of public 
accomii i or public service because 
of re1 race, color, national 
origii. sex, or marital status. 
For purposes of this Section, defendant is a person. 
MCL 37.2103(f). 
MCL 37.2301(a) and (b) define place of public 
accommodation and public service as follows: 
(a) 'Place of public accommodation1 
means a business or an educational, 
refreshment, entertainment, recreation, 
health, or transportation facility, or 
institution of any kind, whether licensed 
or not, whose goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations 
are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise 
made available to the public. 
(b) 'Public service' means a public 
facility, department,• agency, board, orby or 
commission, owned, operated, or managed 
on behalf of the state, a political 
subdivision, or an agency thereof, or a 
tax exempt private agency established 
to provide service to the public. 
There is no Michigan case law further defining what 
constitutes a "public service" under the above-quoted statute. 
However, it is undisputed that defendant is a tax-exempt 
corporation. Furthermore, defendant's promotional literature 
makes clear that the primary object of the defendant is the 
practice of charity in its broadest significance including 
such activities as providing food for the hungry, shelter for 
the homeless, clothing for the needy and medical attention 
to the poor. Clearly, this is service to the public. 
At oral argument defendant's counsel repeatedly argued 
that defendant currently donates only three percent of its 
income to charitable causes. This Court would observe that 
the definition of public service looks to whether the agency 
was "established" to provide public service. Whether defendant 
has in fact all but abandoned the laudable purposes for which 
it was established has no bearing on the fact that defendant 
was established to provide public service. Therefore, this 
Court finds that defendant is a "public service" as that term 
is defined in the Act. 
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Having found defendant to be a public service it is not 
necessary that this Court determine whether defendant is a 
place of public accommodation. Traditional places of public 
accommodation include hotels and restaurants- Concord Rod & 
Gun Club, Inc v Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 
402 Mass 716? 524 NE2d 1364 (1988). In this case, defendant 
operated a de facto public restaurant. Further, they opened 
to the public for weekly bingo games and annual gift and craft 
shows. Therefore, this Court concludes that defendant is a 
place of public accommodation. 
Defendant argues that even if it falls within the 
definitions of § 302, it is entitled to the private club exemption 
under § 303 of the Act: 
Sec. 303. This article shall not 
apply to a private club, or other 
establishment not in fact open to the 
public, except to the extent that the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of the 
private club or establishment are made 
available to the customers or patrons 
of another establishment that is a place 
of public accommodation or is licensed 
by the state under Act No. 8 of the 
Public Acts of 1933, being sections 436.1 
through 436.58 of the Michigan Compiled 
Laws. MCL 37.2303; MSA 3.548(310). 
In Rogers v International Association of Lions Club, 
636 F Supp 1476, 1479 (ED Mich 1986), the Court considered 
four factors in determining the Lions Club was not a private 
club under this Section: "The organization's size, selectivity, 
public services offered, and use of public facilities." The 
Court placed special emphasis on selectivity. In Cornelius v 
Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F Supp 1182 (D Conn 
1974), the Court considered eight factors in determining that 
the Groton, Connecticut Elks Club was a private club under 
similar federal legislation. The Court found that the most 
significant factors were selectivity, formal membership procedure 
and membership control over the admission of new members. 
In the absence of controlling Michigan case law, federal case 
law may be. helpful in deciding civil rights cases* Bouwman v 
Chrysler Corp, 114 Mich App 670, 678 (1982). However, this 
case must be decided on its own facts. 
In this case the factors of size and selectivity 
weigh heavily against finding defendant to be a private club. 
Defendant has over 1,800 members and the only limitations on 
its size are recently self-imposed. Nationally, there are 
1.5 million members. Like the Lions, the Elks are potentially 
unlimited in size. Rogers, supra, p 1479. The defendant has 
the same formal membership procedure as was outlined in Cornelius, 
supra. This case i-s-distinguishable from Cornelius in that 
plaintiff has presented facts showing that the membership 
procedure is a mere formality. No significant process of 
selection can be found in a process that weeds out less than 
two percent of the applicants, most of whom were disqualified 
for reasons pertaining to citizenship. As stated in Rogers, 
supra, p 1480, "the essence of privacy is selectivity. If 
there is little or no selectivity, there is no basis to the 
claim of privacy." This Court finds that defendant has not 
conducted itself as a private club and therefore, does not 
qualify for the private club exemption. 
Defendant also argues that any decision which forces it-
to open its doors to women will violate its members' constitutions 
right to choose with whom they will freely associate. This 
Court is not blind to the fact that persons of the same gender 
may wish to form an association for mutual enrichment, friendship 
and close ties. Such relationships should be protected from 
state intrusion. This type of constitutional argument was 
recognized in Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 
104 S Ct 3244, 82 Ed 2d 462 (1984). It appears that the same 
factors which make a private club truly private also give rise 
to the typos of relationships which the right of association 
insulates from governmental interference: 
Among other things, therefore, they are 
distinguished by such attributes as 
relative smallness, a high degree of 
selectivity in decisions to begin and 
maintain the affiliation, and seclusion 
from others in critical aspects of the 
relationship. As a general matter, 
only relationships with these sorts of 
qualities are likely to reflect the 
considerations that have led to -an 
understanding of freedom of association 
as an intrinsic element of personal 
liberty. 
Roberts, supra, 468 US 620. For the same reasons that this 
Court finds defendant not to be a private club this Court also 
finds defendant not to be the type of organization protected 
by the right of association. Defendant simply is neither small 
nor selective. Defendant lacks the distinctive characteristics 
that might afford constitutional protection to its decision 
to exclude women members. 
Finally, at oral argument defendant -argued that by 
requiring it to admit women to membership, this Court will 
discourage the Elks and other men's organizations from pursuing 
charitable activities. This Court finds it hard to believe 
that the prospect of having to admit women would cause the 
defendant to abandon its primary objective of "charity in its 
broadest significance.• Opening the doors to female membership 
in the Lions and Jaycees has not sounded the death knell for 
these charitable organizations. Furthermore, nothing in this 
Opinion should be construed to mean that private male-only 
associations lose their privilege to exclude women when they 
do charitable works. P^*-r, that privilege is lost when the 
club abandons its priva* .racteristics of smallness and 
selectivity of membership. 
For the foregoing reasons this Court finds that the 
decision of -the Rochester Elks to reject plaintiff's application 
violates the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Defendant is ordered 
to reconsider plaintiff's application without consideration 
of gender. The issue of costs and attorney fees is reserved 
for later decision. 
HILDA R. &ASC 
cincurr juooe 
HILDA R. GAGE 
Circuit Court Judge 
Dated: November 15, 1989 
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